We Publish This Translation Of An Article By I.N.Makarov In Order To Shed Light On A Crucial Period In Soviet History

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov is one of those historical figures whose positive assessments are extremely rare. But the anti-Andropov choir is very loud and polyphonic. The accusations voiced on the ” liberal flank “are mainly reduced to the hackneyed formula of the historian R. Medvedev, with which he titled one of his books — “General Secretary from the Lubyanka”. There and to this day, like a mantra, they repeat after their spiritual “father” A. Yakovlev: “Yuri Andropov is a cunning, insidious and experienced man. I didn’t really study anywhere. Organizer of moral repression, constant pressure on the intelligentsia through exile, expulsion, prisons and “mental hospitals”.

Detractors of the “right” (now it is “in trend”), on the contrary, accuse him of nothing less than the collapse of the USSR. The reader, we believe, has heard a tabloid story about the fact that” pluralism “with” glasnost “and” democracy “was invented back in the 1960s by a company of” hidden Trotskyists ” in the Central Committee of the CPSU: Andropov, Primakov, Arbatov, Inozemtsev-with Kuusinen at the head. Moreover, at least two of them, being “Masons of the highest degree of initiation”, were even awarded the Order of the Bath (apparently for women) by a closed decree of the Queen of England for their subversive anti-Soviet activities. It would be fine if such a thing was carried only by dense marginal scum. The quote belongs to a living, rather prominent diplomat of the Soviet school.

Paradoxically, there is another kind of “presentation” of the Andropov image to the masses. From time to time, depending on the needs of the current moment, some official propagandists and “court” historians present him as a “true patriot”, “imperial”, the ideological heir of Counts Uvarov and Benckendorf. At the same time, they never forget to hint that the well-disguised “conservative — anti-communist” Andropov was nothing more than a political forerunner of other “true patriots” – the current inhabitants of the Kremlin and Staraya Ploshchad.

Multi-layered layers of speculation, rumors and deliberate lies make understanding the historical phenomenon of Yu. V. Andropov, as well as the fleeting time of his stay in the highest party and state posts, a difficult task. This year, which includes both the 110th anniversary of his birth and, at the same time, the 40th anniversary of his death, encourages us to take a closer look at this major figure of the Soviet era. The ideological and political legacy of Andropov also requires updating, which is clearly understood by a not so wide circle of our contemporaries who think and strive for the truth.

At the crossroads

Over the years, it has become hard to remember that the name of the hero of these notes was mentioned in the first edition of the Communist Party Program: “With the broad support of the party masses and society in 1983, Yu.V. Andropov began to restructure the management of the national economy, democratizing state and public life. These initiatives have had a positive impact on the life of the people.” Note that Andropov’s historical mission is directly linked to the concept of “perestroika”. The authors of the main party document in 1995 still boldly use this word. However, the terrible scar left in the people’s memory by Gorbachev and Yeltsin, from which the country still cannot recover, forever disfigured its original, socialist meaning.

A prominent Marxist scholar, A.V. Buzgalin, who left this world prematurely at the end of 2023, considered the history of the Soviet state as a 74-year period of confrontation between two principles — “red” (innovative, creative, amateur) and “gray” (archaic, state-bureaucratic, philistine). Despite all the literary elegance of such “color” associations, it is still more correct to switch to the language of historical materialism.

The formation of the Soviet socialist system is a continuous struggle between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary tendencies of social development. This struggle fit perfectly into the well-known definition of Marx in his Critique of the Gotha Program: “We are not dealing here with a communist society that has developed on its own basis, but, on the contrary, with one that is just emerging from capitalist society, and which, therefore, in all respects, economically, morally, and intellectually, still retains the birthmarks of the old society from the depths of which it emerged”.

In the early 1980s, counterrevolutionary tendencies did not just increase. It was at this point, in our opinion, that the socio-economic prerequisites for the upcoming bourgeois restoration began to take shape in the USSR. The “original” socialism, which we have hastened to declare “developed” and “completely and completely victorious,” was losing its initiative in the economic competition with mature capitalism. If in 1961-75 the average annual growth rate of national income used for consumption and accumulation was 5.3%, then in 1976-80. they fell to 3.9%, and in 1982-even to 3.5%. The average labor productivity of the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) to the level of developed capitalist countries was 52% in industry, and 15% in agriculture. The share of grain imports in state expenditures of the Soviet Union increased to 37% during the XI five-year plan (1981-1985).

As a result of the increasingly obvious discrepancy between the industrial relations that had developed in the 1930s and 1950s and the rapidly growing productive forces, the economy was unbalanced, generating shortages, endless queues, and speculation. There was a shortage of almost everything: modern machinery and equipment, construction materials, consumer goods, food.

In parallel with the accumulation of economic problems, the three driving forces of the coming counter-revolution were being implicitly formed. The leading Soviet elite, which had essentially separated itself into a separate social group, literally before our eyes acquired the characteristics of a new class that did not fit into the generally accepted “three-member” of Soviet social studies: workers, peasants, and intellectuals. The so-called “shopkeepers “and merchants — the germ of the future criminal bourgeoisie of the” dashing nineties “— functioned energetically in the very impressive” shadow ” sector of the economy. In 1979, it even got to the point that in Kislovodsk, as if between state departments, an agreement was concluded between the Caucasian ” thieves in law “and” shopkeepers ” on further joint work. Finally, the nationalist-minded intelligentsia of the Union republics became another force that brought the end of the Soviet system closer. It was she who secretly, and sometimes even openly, inspired the local population with the idea that all the problems in their lives come from the dictates of Moscow, from the Russians. All this was done under the ” smoke screen “of returning to the origins of national identity, to religious and cultural foundations, to the” great past ” of these small nations and nationalities. That is why very soon the “reborn” party bonze Yeltsin, the underground millionaire entrepreneur Tarasov, and the Georgian writer Gamsakhurdia will find themselves in the same ranks of destroyers.

The contrast between the loudly proclaimed communist tomorrow of 1961 and real life today was becoming unbearable. The lack of a clear vision of prospects gave rise to social apathy, cynicism and the whole tangle of abuses associated with them. V. G. Rasputin spoke about this from the rostrum of the eighth writers ‘ Congress: “Russian literature with pain, and not only today, told the whole world about the drunkenness of the Russian peasant and, as a result, the loss of his civic activity.” No wonder his poignant story “Pozhar” became a literary metaphor of those times.

In addition to all this, the “external factor” that has always been active should also be added. Of the 74 Soviet years, only 63 were relatively peaceful. Having brilliantly overcome the” pre — socialist ” tasks of industrialization and the cultural revolution, the Soviet government was forced twice to start creating the production and economic foundations of the new system in the conditions of post-war devastation. In 1982, another (now-Reagan) “crusade” against communism was announced. The Soviet Union (as Russia is now) was once again called the “center of world evil”by the West. Quite in the spirit of the modern Johnsons and Macrons, British Prime Minister Thatcher declared then that the careless policy of the Western powers towards Hitler’s Germany had already led to the Second World War. Therefore, ” it is necessary to counteract the communist plans to seize the world by all means.” A long-term policy aimed primarily at strangling the USSR economically by dragging it into an expensive arms race was bearing fruit. Moscow could not ignore the fact that in just five years, the US military appropriations amounted to a truly astronomical amount-more than $ 2 trillion. In addition, 7 billion rubles. It was spent annually on psychological warfare and other subversive actions against the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

With the departure of its former leader, both expected and sudden, the Soviet power found itself at a crossroads: either continue to plunge into the quagmire of social regression, or reverse the disastrous trend and maintain the communist vector of development. From the socio-class point of view, Yu.V. Andropov became the personification of those social forces that entered the last battle for the continuation of the path that the working people chose in 1917.

The last Bolshevik at the helm of the state

We often hear and read that Andropov was an ambiguous and highly controversial personality. Why, however, is it contradictory? On the contrary, there is every reason to say exactly the opposite. Yuri Vladimirovich possessed a completely integral nature, and this integrity was based on an original historical phenomenon, the name of which is Bolshevism. By the will of fate, the Communist Party and the Soviet State received in him the first and, unfortunately, the last Bolshevik-type leader after 1953.

At the end of the distant twenties, in his greeting to J. V. Stalin on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of his birth, pathetically entitled “A Hard-headed Bolshevik”, G. K. Ordzhonikidze identified such components of his spiritual image as ” loyalty to Leninism, an iron will to put Leninism into practice and a huge organizational talent.” To the collective portrait of a typical Bolshevik leader, drawn by “raging Sergo”, it is still worth adding a couple of strokes. First of all, there is a free command of the scientific theory of Marxism, the very classical Marxist “training” that presupposes a broad outlook, in Lenin’s well-known expression, knowledge of “all the riches that humanity has developed.”

As a result of unprecedented social upheavals and a natural change of generations, the leading core of the Soviet state was abandoned first by the “Lenin Guard”, then by the heroic” call ” of the crucial twenties and thirties. By the mid-sixties, the level of theoretical literacy and spiritual culture of senior managers had fallen sharply. A. N. Shelepin, who had worked in the upper echelons of the party and state power for more than a quarter of a century, recalled not without amazement one of the first persons of the USSR. The latter, as it turned out in personal communication, had not the slightest idea about the fundamental works of V. I. Lenin, not to mention other classics of Marxism.

The contrast between Andropov and such “ardent wrestlers” was absolutely obvious. Everyone who has ever come in contact with him in life and work spoke about this in one voice. There is plenty of evidence for this. Here are just three of them. E. I. Chazov, in the first half of the 1980s-head of the 4th Main Department under the Ministry of Health of the USSR: “He was an intelligent, well-educated man, well versed in literature and art. Nothing human was alien to him: neither poetry nor love. ” N. K. Baibakov, chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, recalled Andropov as “a highly erudite, intellectual man, a man of a sharp analytical mind and great spiritual qualities.” A. I. Lukyanov, first deputy head of the General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU: “He told me about his music library. It was an interesting conversation, which I remember with a story about the difference between the works of Richard Wagner and Beethoven, whose works he loved and appreciated very much. Quite unexpectedly, a great connoisseur and a keen connoisseur of the world’s musical art appeared before me.”

It may reasonably be objected: quoting supporters and fans is a simple matter. Well, let’s give our word to the haters, too. The former chief archivist of the Russian Federation, Mr. Pihoe, who sent a huge number of truly unique documents abroad in the 1990s, does not like Andropov’s “communist fundamentalism”. Similarly, Volkogonov, the” stripped-off political instructor, ” considered him “the most orthodox Soviet leader after Lenin and Stalin.”

No less important distinguishing feature of people from the “Bolshevik cohort” was a pronounced inner “steel core”, the components of which were fearlessness, the ability to take justified risks, a certain rigidity (sometimes even maximalism) in decision — making, complete selflessness. The decisive influence on the formation of Andropov as a leader was apparently exerted by two most difficult stages of his biography: the organization of the partisan movement during the years of the struggle against fascism and, to put it in his own poetic stanza, “the Hungarian sorrowful lesson”.

In 1941-43, through the efforts of “Mohican” -this was the underground call sign of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of the Karelo — Finnish SSR-more than a thousand scouts, radio operators and signalmen were trained and sent to the partisan detachments of the republic, many of whom were awarded government awards. In the rear of the invaders and even on the territory of neighboring Finland, the Komsomolets Karelii youth detachment fearlessly operated, which made 17 combat raids. A high assessment of their contribution to the overall Victory was the telegram of the Supreme Commander: “Belomorsk. Central Committee of the Komsomol of the Karelo-Finnish SSR. ANDROPOV. Please convey my warm greetings and gratitude to the Komsomol members and youth of the Karelo-Finnish SSR, who have raised 1,191,000 rubles for the construction of armaments for the Red Army. N. N. Mesyats, one of the recognized leaders of the Komsomol in the 1950s, wrote about that harsh time:”The Komsomol brought up genuine knights who were selflessly devoted to their people, and a whole galaxy of state and public figures emerged from the walls of its Central Committee, including Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov.”

Once again in a combat situation, he was destined to get into 10 years later, already in the rank of josl in Hungary. During the days of the fascist revolt that broke out due to the grossest mistakes of the leadership of the ruling Party of Labor, Andropov had to risk his life more than once. Just a little more and he could suffer the fate of those who were hung upside down on lampposts and trees by a brutal horde, burned alive. On the way to the airport to meet A. I. Mikoyan, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who arrived in Budapest, Soviet diplomats were ambushed. A direct witness of the incident, V. N. Kazemirov, said:: “The crowd, consisting mainly of students and young people, threw stones, boards, rolled barrels at the embassy cars, and then opened fire… It was impossible to turn back, as the enraged mob continued to pursue the trapped cavalcade. Then Yu. V. Andropov with some employees, leaving their cars, moved towards the pursuers. Confused by this “psychic attack,” the disordered demonstrators, speechless with surprise, as if mesmerized by the audacity of Soviet diplomats, frowningly parted.”

In the fateful moments of his life, he always retained an indomitable strength of spirit, a willingness to self-denial in the name of a great cause. The liberal-minded academician G. A. Arbatov, who left detailed memories of the years of joint work, wrote with some misunderstanding characteristic of people of this type, that Andropov “was known for personal selflessness, even reaching asceticism”, was distinguished by “indifference to worldly goods, and also by the fact that in this regard he kept in a” black body”family”. The future leader of the country was also distinguished by “the lack of power-seeking, the desire to become “the main one”. It is possible that he began to think of himself as Brezhnev’s successor simply because he did not see anyone else (in any case, there was no worthy candidate at that time).”

In the light of this, Yu. V. Andropov’s difficult decision to take the highest post in the party in the late autumn of 1982, with full awareness of the incurable nature of his illness, appears to be nothing more than an act of moral self-sacrifice. The widespread myth of the notorious Andropov’s “mania for power” is also destroyed by a significant fact noted in the memoirs of V. A. Kryuchkov. A close associate of Andropov for many years emphasized that at the time of his election as Secretary General, he had every reason to refer to poor health and therefore suggest that the Politburo think about another candidate. “However, they did not listen to his request,” summed up a real eyewitness of that difficult choice.

These, though far from exhaustive, “touches to the portrait” give the right to speak of Andropov as the last Bolshevik in the main cabinet of the Kremlin. Undoubtedly, Yuri Vladimirovich knew the true value of many of those whom idle rumor had appointed him as “like-minded people”and ” followers”. About one of the “companions” we have already mentioned, he said the following, not without humor: “You know, there are Communists who cannot be considered Bolsheviks. Take Arbatov, for example — he’s a communist, of course. But I can’t call him a Bolshevik.”

The Short Renaissance of Leninism

Lenin in Andropov’s life was as natural and irreplaceable as air. Andropov did not start and finish any business with the name of Lenin on his lips, not for a red word, not for a drawing with the name of Lenin on his lips. Here, it would seem, is a purely “technical”, working moment — a “narrow” meeting with the Central Committee secretaries on December 7, 1982. The newly elected General Secretary opens it with the following words:: “I would like to focus on one, in my opinion, very important issue — the issue of strengthening the work on monitoring and verifying the implementation of decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. As you know, V. I. Lenin called this work a living, organizational activity of party organizations.” He quotes it from memory, but it is absolutely accurate. Others were sometimes surprised by Andropov’s appeal to Lenin, even in everyday life. A certain Klemashov, who for a short time happened to be the attending physician of the Central Committee secretary Andropov, recalled with ill-concealed hostility: “He is a man fanatically devoted to the ideas of V. I. Lenin. During the last long conversation I had with him in 1968, he said to me, ‘ Stick to Lenin and walk firmly on the earth.’”

The spirit of Leninism was felt in both large-scale and small actions of Andropov. Just 3-4 years after his passing, the slogan of fighting the abuses of the party elite will become a cult for the Yeltsins, Gdlyans, Sobchaks, Stankeviches and legions of other “sufferers” for the people’s happiness, who later created one of the most monstrous corruption systems in the world. Unlike the noted fighters against the privileges of others, Andropov, having taken the helm of the state, began with himself. Immediately, the large “Secretariat under the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU” was disbanded, duplicating the functions of a number of departments of the central party apparatus. The departure of the “royal” motorcade of government cars, which constantly accompanied the “first person” of the state, stopped. Before the eyes of society, Lenin’s lines seemed to come to life: “Comrade Dzerzhinsky! I have a serious concern: there is no “exaggeration” in the costs of my garage, which is taken, it seems, under the strict supervision of the GPU. Isn’t it time to” squeeze ” this institution and reduce its costs?”.

In place of verbal hype, hackneyed cliches, empty phraseology, and disgusting ostentation, a sober analysis of the actual state of affairs, efficiency, and strict exactingness very soon came. For example, the diary entry of the deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, A. S. Chernyaev, dated December 20, 1982, says a lot: “I was at the Politburo — a completely different picture … They speak fluently, make remarks, and discuss. Andropov, as well as at the Secretariat, fishes out the main thing and makes practical conclusions-tasks.” Another member of the party’s Central Committee staff, A. M. Alexandrov-Agentov, also noticed this detail: “It is characteristic that of all the leaders with whom I had to work, only Andropov practiced serious collective discussion of issues that were scheduled for consideration at the next meeting of the Politburo. We all gathered around him in his office, each reporting the essence of “his” question and his thoughts on ways and methods of solving it. Others expressed their opinions. Andropov either agreed, or objected, or simply took note. But, in any case, in the end, he was better “armed” on each of the issues.” How not to compare this again with a small “sketch” from the meetings of the Council of People’s Commissars of the early 1920s: “Vladimir Ilyich never could get off with general phrases, he always pinned speakers to the wall, demanding facts and documents.”

The distance between the previously “bronzed” supreme power and ordinary people was rapidly shrinking. Once again, as in the early Soviet years, regular reports on Politburo and Government meetings began to appear in the central newspapers. The same professional propagandist Chernyaev could not believe his eyes: “For the first time in many years, the people rush to read the advanced Pravda ! Almost gone is the bureaucracy, and there is almost no vulgar bragging.” In addition, an attempt was made to introduce the publication of complete verbatim reports of the Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This practice existed in the 1920s, then was resumed in the period from 1958 to 1965, and finally returned in the fall of 1983. It was then that Politizdat published a verbatim report of the June Plenum of the Central Committee, which reviewed the issues of ideological and mass-political work of the party, as well as made a number of organizational decisions. The next time the transcript of the plenary session of the central governing body of the party will become publicly available only in 1990. Andropov’s message to society was very clear: the party has nothing to hide from its class support — the working man.

Comparing himself with Lenin, Andropov tried to pay as little attention as possible to the form, and as much as possible to the essence. The very style of his state activity showed that honoring the memory of the leader of the Great October, the continuation of the work he started, does not consist in erecting more and more of his monuments. At the initiative of the party leader, in April 1983, a landmark resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee “On eliminating excesses in spending state and public funds on the construction of memorial structures”was adopted.

At the same time, Andropov always had a special attitude towards historical symbols that radiated the light of the first years of the Revolution, the warmth of Lenin’s hands. So, while still Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, on September 13, 1974, he sent the following proposal to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party: “On November 7, 1918, V. I. Lenin opened a memorial plaque on Red Square on the Senate Tower, on which the words were inscribed: “To those who fell in the struggle for peace and brotherhood of peoples”… It should be considered appropriate to instruct the Ministry of Culture of the USSR to take measures to restore the plaque on the Senate Tower of the Moscow Kremlin.”

The battle for the revival of Leninist values in the mass public consciousness, launched by Andropov, inspired many then, but first of all-the old-timers of the party. Lenin’s legendary comrade-in-arms, V. M. Molotov, who crossed the 93-year-old milestone, rather felt the long-awaited continuity of revolutionary traditions in him with an unmistakable class sense. “Over the past couple of years,” he said in an interview with the poet F. I. Chuev, ” the appearance of two people has become a great achievement. First, Andropov. This came as a surprise to me, because I knew a lot about cadres, particularly Bolshevik cadres… It turns out that in politics, he is a solid person with a broad outlook. A reliable person. Apparently, he’s grown a lot over the years… And the second person is Yaruzelsky.”

Y. D. Chanyshev, a member of the RSDLP (b) since March 1917, expressed the same thoughts at a meeting in the Central Committee of the CPSU with party veterans held in the late summer of 1983: “We are very pleased that the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party conducts business in a Leninist, Bolshevik way. And we ask you — do not be liberal with those who do not think about the common good, not about work, but only about personal well-being.” In response, Yu. V. Andropov replied: “We promise you that!” But the promise never came true. Unfortunately, the renaissance of genuine Leninism, not” poster ” one, turned out to be short-lived. In the near future, the “liquidators” clique, under the Jesuit slogan “You are giving a return to the true Lenin!”, will start dismantling the entire Leninist legacy.

Political thinker

Andropov, without any exaggeration, can be called a master of political aphorism. Not too weighty collections of his works are filled with judgments, always concise, accurate and imaginative. This is the case when words are cramped, but thoughts are spacious.

“Outside and apart from Leninism, Marxism is simply impossible in our time” (from the report “Leninism is an inexhaustible source of revolutionary energy and creativity of the masses” (1982). “Our politics is a class policy in its principles and in its goals” (from the report “Leninism — the Science and Art of Revolutionary Creativity “(1976). “They want to disarm us, and arm NATO even more. We will not do that” (from the answers to the magazine “Spiegel” (1983). “Militant Zionist organizations that act as tools of the most reactionary circles of imperialism” (from the speech “Ideological sabotage — a poisoned weapon of imperialism “(1979). “The issue of strengthening discipline applies not only to workers, IT specialists. This applies to everyone, starting with ministers” (from a conversation with Moscow machine tool builders (1983). This includes his humorous poems published after the author’s death about a “likhodey” who once “shaved off” a banality that was picked up by other “smart guys”, “not noticing (what a misfortune!) that more often people spoil power”.

And finally, what is quoted very often, but almost never exactly. “…To put it bluntly, we have not yet adequately studied the society in which we live and work, and have not fully revealed its inherent laws, especially economic ones” (from a speech at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (1983).

“Homo politikus” (political man) — this is how Andropov was jokingly called in a group of consultants of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Relations with the Communist and workers ‘ parties of socialist countries. One of them — F. M. Burlatsky – among other advantages, especially emphasized Andropov’s ability to “deeply penetrate the political essence of any problem”: “He, in fact, did not think otherwise, except in political categories. Any question-whether it was a collective farm, an enterprise, a party organization, an event in Eastern Europe or in the West-in his mouth acquired a political connotation and characterization. This means that he considered the issue from the point of view of the country’s state policy, the consequences that a particular event or decision may have for its interests.”

Andropov was able to feel the pace of History itself, to delve into the political philosophy of its turning point, enriching Soviet Marxism with a number of new ideas that did not fit into the established “canons”. To begin with, he suggested “having a clear idea of where we are.” “To get ahead of ourselves means to put forward impossible tasks; to stop only at what has been achieved means not to use everything that we have at our disposal. To see our society in real dynamics, with all its opportunities and needs-that’s what is required now.” This, to modern eyes, uncomplicated thesis looked impressive against the background of bravura reports of endless victories and successes, so common in recent times.

Andropov’s sober conclusion gave the entire system of social sciences of the USSR a powerful research impulse. It is difficult to overestimate the fact that he managed to push the formation of Russian sociology, which was stalled again in the 1970s. As early as May 1918, when establishing the Socialist Academy of Social Sciences, V. I. Lenin wrote:: “one of the priority tasks is to set a number of social studies.” This idea was developed during the famous discussion about trade unions in 1920: it is extremely necessary to conduct a series of surveys and surveys, compare them with objective statistical data and make practical, business-like suggestions for the future. And in general, “more knowledge of the facts, fewer claims to communist principled word disputes.” How all this is in tune with the” winged “Andropov expression:” Mood for deeds, not loud words!”.

Let’s put it bluntly: Lenin’s attitudes were not always dominant in the development of Soviet social studies. Specific social studies were usually episodic and spontaneous in nature. Scientific work in this area was mainly aimed not at studying social problems, but at operating with general concepts and endless quoting. But at the June 1983 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, for the first time in many years, it was again said that in sociological research “it is time to move from assessing the state of social processes to predicting them, from isolated public opinion studies to their systematic conduct.”

The gradual analysis of the deposits of old dogmas and outdated provisions, the turn of the face to life became noticeable in the “thick” scientific and theoretical journals. Indeed, who would have previously had the courage to say something about a university course in scientific communism: teachers “cannot present this science as a logical system of knowledge”? “Each topic is presented by itself, out of organic connection with others, which leads to a fragmentary, one — sided and eclectic perception of the material, “wrote Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V. Fetisov from Leningrad on the pages of the main theoretical and political journal Kommunist.

Such articles acted as a kind of “herbicides”for the poisonous shoots of adaptability and renegade behavior that were already sprouting in the field of social and humanitarian disciplines. Within a decade, we will hear the revelations of one of the most prominent Marxist-Leninist experts in the Soviet Union, academician Theodor Oizerman. When he reached the age of one hundred and finally published a little book with the telling title “Justification of Revisionism”, he stated literally the following:: “This course was empty. Everything that Marx and Engels say about scientific communism can be described in 4-5 pages.”

The” empty ” rants of the Oizermans really avoided the real contradictions of the emerging socialist society. At the theoretical level, this complex of issues has not been considered, perhaps, since the time of Stalin’s “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR”. In particular, pernicious illusions were generated by the prevailing position among some “philosophers” that non-antagonistic contradictions are supposedly reconciled under the conditions of the socialist system. In reality, they could only be resolved in wrestling.

Meanwhile, it was at the beginning of the eighties that the problem of improving the mechanism of fair distribution of public goods was raised for the first time during the years of Soviet power. In the first issue of the Kommunist, published in 1983, a real “thunderbolt out of a clear sky” was the admission that “everything is not all right in this mechanism.” “We are deeply alien to any manifestation of elitist snobbery,” the magazine stated. — Under the conditions of socialism, no castes that stand outside the masses and above the masses are allowed… Neither the official positions held, nor the level of education, nor the importance of public functions performed-does not give grounds for any person, any social group, community or association to claim an exclusive position.”

Equally unexpected was the analytical note sent by the General Secretary to the Politburo in the autumn of 1983. Its essence was reduced to the proposal “not to be confined to the official principle of nominating candidates” to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In other words, it was planned to limit the operation of the principle of “automatic” entry of the highest party and state nomenclature into the main authority of the country and, on the contrary, to pave the way there for “interesting”, “notable” people, “conductors of the party line among the people”. Unfortunately, Andropov was only able to start solving the grandiose task of ridding the party and the country of the parasitic “growth” — scoundrels who have grown into their bossy chairs and are engaged in personal enrichment. In a number of regional, city and district party organizations, the leadership was updated by 25-35%.

One of the most specific and, at the same time, most acute contradictions of early Soviet-type socialism was embodied in the national question. On the one hand, the Soviet government raised dozens of small ethnic groups to the level of “historical life”, giving them a written language, a new culture and way of life, and a national intelligentsia. On the other hand, according to academician-ethnographer Yu. V. Bromley, it formed no less than 23 Soviet nations. However, a nation, as you know, is not an ethno-cultural concept, but a socio-political one. Meanwhile, by 1979, only 16.3 out of 124.6 million non-Russian people in the USSR recognized Russian as a means of international communication as their native language.

When preparing Andropov’s first report as head of the party, materials with the usual narrative that the national question has been completely and definitively resolved in our country were placed on his desk. The Secretary General drew attention to this place: “It is solved, but what exactly is it? If we talk about national exploitation, the backwardness of the suburbs, and economic and cultural inequality, we have really solved the problem here. But how can we explain the nationalist manifestations, including violence in a number of regions of the Central Asian republics, nationalism in the Caucasus, and the persistence of nationalist prejudices in Ukraine? In short, we still need to think about it.” Thus, in the report on the 60th anniversary of the USSR, a completely innovative paragraph appeared in terms of emphasis: “Life shows that the economic and cultural progress of all nations and nationalities is inevitably accompanied by the growth of their national consciousness. This is a natural and objective process. It is important, however, that natural pride in the achievements achieved does not turn into national arrogance or conceit, does not give rise to a tendency to isolation, disrespect for other nations and nationalities. And such negative phenomena still occur. And it would be wrong to explain this only by remnants of the past. They are sometimes fed by our own mistakes in our work. Here, comrades, there are no trifles. Everything is important here — the attitude to the language, to the monuments of the past, and the interpretation of historical events, and how we transform villages and cities, affect the working and living conditions of people.” Surprisingly accurate and visionary words.

From ideas to practice

From the context of Andropov’s speeches and articles, it followed that the party ideologists were very hasty with “developed socialism”. “Our country is at the beginning of this long historical stage, which, in its turn, will naturally know its own periods, its own stages of growth,” he wrote in his main theoretical work, The Doctrine of Karl Marx and Some Questions of Socialist Construction in the USSR.

It is noteworthy that the political leadership of another socialist state, which was then on the verge of major changes, adopted Andropov’s wording almost unchanged. At the XIII Congress of the Communist Party of China (1987), it was emphasized: “our socialist society is still at the initial stage of development and we need not jump over it, but proceed from this reality.” Moreover, this conceptual position remains valid to this day. From the rostrum of the 19th CPC National Congress (2017), Chinese President Xi Jinping said: “We are still at the initial stage of socialism and will continue to be for a long time.”

By the way, the restoration of friendship and cooperation with the great eastern neighbor was gradually brought to the highest priority of foreign policy. “Take China,” Andropov argued at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on August 25, 1983.… And now, after more than two decades, you look at those events and think: why, exactly? Who needed it? What exactly was the argument about? And you don’t find anything serious to justify our position.” As a follow-up to these considerations, at the Politburo commission on China, he strongly recommended looking for ways to overcome the prolonged absurd discord that is not necessary for both sides. Shakhnazarov still remembers his strategic lesson: “Remember Lenin: the outcome of the battle will be decided in China, India and other Eastern countries, where billions of people live, the vast majority of the world’s population. So now it turns out. There, in the developing countries, the battlefield is moving, forces that imperialism cannot overcome are rising up there.” Here, too, Andropov set the Leninist task: “Every member of the Politburo, when considering any question, should keep in mind the state of the communist movement.”

We have already noted that a few months of the country’s renewal gave scope for creative Marxist thought. Apparently, only by a symbolic coincidence, it was in the February 1984 issue of Voprosy Filosofii (Questions of Philosophy), the same issue where Andropov’s obituary was published, that the bold reflections of two social scientists, A. P. Butenko and V. S. Semenov, devoted to the typology of contradictions of real socialism, appeared. As the leading one, they called “the contradiction between the existing predominantly extensive path of economic development and the objectively required predominantly intensive path of economic and overall social development.” To grasp the meaning of socio-philosophical terms, it was not difficult for any business manager to understand. A prominent economist, academician L. M. Abalkin, spoke a little later about the state of affairs at that time: “We can say that we were in a pre-crisis state. If drastic measures were not taken — and the first steps were taken in 1982, after the November Plenum-the consequences are even difficult to imagine.”

Andropov himself illustrated the initial results of the “decisive measures” to restore elementary order in the sphere of production at the meeting of the first secretaries of the party committees on April 18, 1983 with the following figures: “The plan for the first quarter for industrial sales was fulfilled by 102%. Compared to the first quarter of last year, the volume of industrial production increased by 4.7%. In 1982, this figure was 2.1%. Labor productivity increased by 3.9% compared to 1.5% in the first quarter of last year.”

Shortly before that, in March 1983, the anti-Soviet emigrant magazine Posev, based on the materials of its “underground” informants, published an interesting note: “Under Andropov, it became stricter. You can’t be a minute late for work… At the tannery, the teams were re-sorted into links. Bad employees were herded into separate units. It used to be: “Pull up the laggard”. Now: “The laggards-to the lagging teams!”. Earlier it was: “Turner, clean up your workplace!”, now: “Turner, you are not a cleaner, but a qualified worker. Cleaning will not be done by an expert. You stay at the machine until the last minute!””.

Not ordinary people, but the “egghead” public with an anti-Soviet flavor still loves the legends about how the police and vigilantes caught “truants” in baths and hairdressers. N. I. Ryzhkov, then Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for Economic Affairs, spoke very well about this: “Critics of the former General Secretary accuse him of distortions in the struggle for discipline. Yes, as always, there were distortions. Even during prayer, fools bruise their foreheads. Distortions not only in this case (and I can name dozens of similar examples) were the result of campaigning, the desire to complete as quickly as possible, ahead of schedule, what takes time and patience. But critics forget that it was he, regardless of personality, who cruelly questioned the gap between word and deed, for empty talk and praise. And this applied primarily to party functionaries, members of the Central Committee, economic and state leaders.”

Nevertheless, Andropov’s main motivation was not the maximum tightening of state discipline and the ruthless fight against corruption as an end in itself, but the most complete disclosure of all the advantages of socialism as a more progressive socio-economic system. The decisive criterion here was and remains the productivity of labor — according to Lenin, “in the last analysis, the most important thing, the most important thing for the victory of the new social system.” And it almost worked out. The consequences of certain steps in the economy, and in any other sphere of social existence, do not immediately make themselves felt. Andropovsky “reserve” affected later. In 1987, economists L. B. Vid, E. A. Ivanov, and V. N. Kirichenko summarized: over the five — year period since 1983, as a result of vigorous measures to strengthen manageability in the national economy, the growth of national income used for consumption and accumulation amounted to 116.5%; industrial production — 120%; average annual gross agricultural output-105.5%. real income of the population — 111%. And finally, the main thing: due to the growth of social labor productivity, 90% of the increase in national income was obtained. The last indicator indicated a turning point in the entire dynamics of socialist construction. For the first time, in accordance with Marx’s forecasts, socialism came close to developing on its own economic base.

From the American ” Sovietologists “to the domestic liberals of the Gaidar-Chubais” spill ” migrated the well-worn thesis that at the heart of Andropov’s still timid but significant successes lay only administrative coercion, a command shout, and general obligation. However, those who are smarter are forced to recognize other factors. The leading part of the society was also inspired by the new law on labor collectives, which provides for expanding the participation of employees in the management of their enterprises, introducing the practice of preliminary discussion of key decisions of the party and the government in factory and factory shops. This is also the “launch” of a large-scale economic experiment involving economic entities of five union and republican ministries. It introduced elements of organizational independence, self-financing, reduced the number of “benchmarks”, but, at the same time, increased responsibility for non-fulfillment of contractual obligations. Even such a” patent ” anti-Soviet as R. Pihoya argued that the so-called “administrative-command system” in the form in which it was formed in the 1930s and 60s, in the first half of the eighties, had already ceased to exist. In its place came the “distribution and coordination system”, where the interests of the state and various departments collided.

* * *

Yu. V. Andropov more than once openly admitted that he does not have ready-made recipes. His inquisitive mind only groped for possible solutions to the accumulated acute problems of Soviet society. What these paths might have been continues to be fiercely debated today. Perhaps one thing is clear (it is hard to disagree with Vorotnikov): “the country and the party have lost an outstanding leader. And we lost it at a very important and difficult stage.”

And yet there is no way to avoid the question that was raised in the “inner circle” of colleagues in the mournful February days of 1984: “Are we exaggerating the role of Andropov too much? He worked as a General Secretary for quite a short time, just a little over a year.” We’ll also add other hackneyed cliches here: what about Gorbachev, who was given “green street”? Couldn’t the “omniscient” chairman of the KGB not know who and what “breathes”?

There are a great many fans of making “historical judgments”, passing peremptory sentences left and right, these days. Meanwhile, their “authoritative” accusations are ridiculous: even during the “collective leadership” period of the 1950s,” tracking “and listening to senior party officials was strictly forbidden to the” competent authorities”. I simply didn’t have enough time to figure out who was who. However, Andropov managed to “see through” the rotten interior of the long-reborn Yakovlev. On the suggestion of another “intercessor” to return him to work in Moscow, he snapped: “Back to the Central Committee apparatus, there is no way for him!”.

As for the other and main “co-author of katastroika”, there is a revealing fragment about him in the memoirs of V. V. Grishin, who was a member of the top political leadership of the USSR for at least two decades: “Now there is a lot of writing about the fact that Andropov allegedly focused on Gorbachev as his successor as head of the country … to say that Andropov did not include Gorbachev in the narrow circle of party leaders, never mentioned him as a possible successor to the post of party leader, and did not distinguish him from other members of the Politburo in any way.” These observations are confirmed by Assistant Secretary General V. V. Sharapov. Andropov, in his opinion, “did not take steps to further promote Mikhail Sergeyevich. Apparently, there were reasons for this. In any case, in the remarks thrown out in conversation with us after conversations with Gorbachev, Yuri Vladimirovich often remarked: “We still have to work and work with him…””.

At the same time, as usual, it is silent that he was not mistaken in the competence and decency of V. I. Vorotnikov, N. I. Ryzhkov, and A. I. Lukyanov. Until the age of one hundred, E. K. Ligachev, who was promoted to secretary of the Central Committee of the party on the initiative of Andropov, tirelessly fought for the cause of socialism. One of the first to declare an irreconcilable war on Gorbachev and Yakovlev was G. A. Zyuganov, who was mobilized to work in the Central Committee under the “Andropov draft” of 1983.

Yu. V. Andropov’s name will forever be associated with the unique experience of the Soviet Communists in protecting the maturing, but still far from formed, socialist system from external and internal counterrevolution. “Its activities were aimed at ensuring that the country, having mobilized the huge potential accumulated over the previous decades, made a qualitative leap in its development, “the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation said in its Resolution”On the 100th anniversary of the birth of Yu.V. Andropov”. Even if this experience was developed in extremely peculiar conditions, it will have to be used more than once in scientific research and in social practice.

This name will not be forgotten by future generations of party members. Here is one of the testaments left to them by Andropov: “The dangerous fungus of philistinism that penetrates the youth environment cannot but cause concern. Such phenomena, such sentiments, must be resolutely combated. Our heirs need to inculcate a view of life in which material goods (and they should be and will become more over time) would not prevail over a person, but would serve to satisfy his highest needs. Only the spiritual wealth of a person is truly unlimited. And although you can’t put it in your wallet or hang it on the wall for the sake of prestige — we are in favor of such hoarding. The only thing worthy of a man, a Soviet man.”

So it will remain in the history of the communist movement, in the history of our country. Strict and honest. A diehard romantic. A silverless man. A creative Marxist-Leninist. An unfulfilled hope for a decent future. A giant of the human spirit.

I. N. Makarov,

Chairman of the Central Council of RUSO.